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The system of public administration in Northern Ireland has, perhaps inevitably, been of secondary
concern during 30 years of inter-communal sectarian strife. Faced with combating terrorism, suc-
cessive United Kingdom governments would not consider reform of the province’s local public
administration, pending a resolution of the wider constitutional imbroglio. Consequently, much
of the system atrophied, becoming progressively more cumbersome and ill-equipped to deal with
the requirements of modern government. Moreover, to help minimise charges of sectarian dis-
crimination, quangos provided many public services, compounding the ‘democratic deficit’ of
Direct Rule. In 1998, the Belfast Agreement (also known as the Good Friday Agreement), offered
a breakthrough in the search for a durable settlement that could command cross-community
support. As part of subsequent devolved executive’s Programme for Government, a Review of
Public Administration (RPA) was launched to consider sub-regional governance arrangements with
a view to enhancing democratic accountability and improving efficiency through streamlining the
current arrangements. To that end, the RPA has been committed to adhering to clear principles
on which any credible reform should be based. While devolution itself has proved fitful, the work
of the RPA has continued apace. Although embarking on reforms within functioning devolution
is ministers’ preferred option, there is a determination to continue the reform process irrespective
of the present impasse. This paper outlines the issues, values and concepts that might shape the
principles for conducting a review before considering the particular context within Northern
Ireland. It also considers the impediments to overhauling the present arrangements and specu-
lates on the likely outcome.
The choice for Ulster has always been limited democracy with stability
or unlimited democracy without stability (Northern Ireland civil servant,
anonymous).
The structure and operation of Northern Ireland’s wider system of public admin-
istration were accorded a lowly priority by successive British governments through-
out the Troubles. With murder and mayhem threatening to engulf them, Northern
Ireland Office ministers were preoccupied with managing the most intractable and
wearisome corner of the United Kingdom’s territorial estate. As the temporary
expedient of Direct Rule matured into ‘permanent impermanence’, any meaning-
ful overhaul was effectively embargoed. Consequently, while recognition of the
need for reform enjoyed rare universal consent of the key protagonists, ministers
felt little inclination to immerse themselves in thankless upheaval, the inevitable
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outcome of which would be controversial, divisive and problematic. However, the
Belfast or the Good Friday Agreement (Agreement) in 1998 lifted this extended
moratorium and, in their Programme for Government, Northern Ireland’s new
political masters launched a Review of Public Administration (RPA) in 2002. More-
over, despite the subsequently fitful experience of devolution, their resolve has sur-
vived the re-imposition of Direct Rule. Thus, in the medium term, there is every
prospect of substantial reform, notably sub-regional governance, in Northern
Ireland.
This paper seeks to accomplish two key objectives. First, it outlines the key issues,
values and concepts that inform the development of principles for reappraising the
continuing viability of any system of public administration. Second, it considers the
particular context obtaining within Northern Ireland and the associated impedi-
ments to overhauling the present arrangements, speculating on the revised con-
figuration likely to emerge.
Issues, Values and Concepts: Developing Principles 
for Reform
In outlining the key issues, values and concepts that arise in any reform process,
this section considers the implications and impact of the changing status of local
government in the UK (including Northern Ireland) and the associated emergence
of a system of local governance, as part of a broader trend readily observable across
Europe. Based on a review of the established literature, it outlines the criteria and
principles that might underpin reform (from various theoretical perspectives) while
acknowledging how the imperatives of political calculus frequently outweigh any
rational or objective argument. In so doing, it seeks to provide lessons for those
engaged in undertaking reform.
From Local Government to Local Governance
In observing a shift from welfare to regulatory state, several commentators in the
1980s referred to the rise of a post-Fordist regime. ‘Fordist’ mass production, large
hierarchically organised business organisations, mass consumption and state inter-
vention gave way to flexible, small batch and demand-led production, segmented
marketing, a rise of small and medium enterprises, labour market fluidity and a
growing marginalised part-time temporary work force (Rhodes, 1997, p. 173).
Such changing values in global political economy have implied changing roles for
government, especially at sub-national level (Stoker, 1989). Most European coun-
tries have experienced local government reorganisation in the last three decades,
albeit enormously varied in scope and impact, with a high incidence of funda-
mental reforms and rapid changes (Dente and Kjellberg, 1988). Just as the expan-
sion of the public sector had obvious consequences for regional local government
structures in the twentieth century, consequently, the regulatory state must simi-
larly remodel, subject to the exigencies of territorial management, especially in
regions that constitute a contested domain. The watchwords of the regulatory state
– flexibility, fragmentation and marketisation of public services – have had a notice-
able impact on regional and sub-regional levels via a process of decentralisation.
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Globalisation raises questions over the role of regional and local institutions within
a wider international framework (Mawson, 1998, p. 236). The assumption of self-
sufficiency in many multi-purpose local government systems (namely, that when
given a task, any local authority has to undertake or provide it directly) is no longer
automatic. The ‘enabling authority’ idea with its purchaser–provider split is com-
monplace for many services. That more rapidly changing societies need a flexible
and changing pattern of response has become received wisdom. At the heart of the
ensuing maelstrom, local government is at the crossroads between society, politics
and administration and might be expected to bear the brunt of any changes that
occur, be they incremental, seismic or otherwise.
The introduction of regional tiers inevitably entails consequences for local govern-
ment (and governance) including the possibility of fundamental overhauls of such
structures better to suit the new dispensation. As the Committee on Local and
Regional Democracy (of the Council of Europe) (CDLR, 2002) outlines, ‘restructur-
ing of territorial authorities has to be guided by a comprehensive vision of theory of
governmental structure.’ (Appendix 1, Section 2). The design of sub-national terri-
torial authorities may be drawn in relation to a number of parameters: size, func-
tions, autonomy and mode of operation. In turn, their relationship with the system
of sub-regional governance revolves around similar considerations. However, there
is no instructor’s manual for operationalising such a ‘comprehensive vision’. More-
over, there is little consensus on how any reform might proceed with no generally
accepted solutions to the problem of the ‘best’ structure for local government.
The map of European local government offers all kinds of variations. ...
The very few studies carried out up to now show us contradictory and
heterogeneous results. They all depend on the kind of services included
in the analysis, the type of demographic structure, the distribution of
power within the political system (central, federal, asymmetrical federal),
the number of tiers of government, the level of public expenditure, the
type of competencies established for each level of government, and those
specifically corresponding to local government, and finally, the kind of
political culture within each context (CDLR, 2001, para. 39).
Definitional difficulties apart, promoting one objective (for example, ‘efficiency’)
at the expense of another (for example, ‘democracy’) is a political problem that
requires a political decision. The CDLR observed candidly – if unhelpfully for the
would-be reformer – that ‘research cannot decide these questions, but it can offer
analysis to be taken into consideration in the decision-making process, mainly to
avoid unfounded decisions’ (CDLR, 2001, para. 28). The debate has been joined
with searching questions over the very requirement for local government in con-
temporary society. The post-Fordist stress on market processes and citizens being
consumers as distinct from political actors ‘downgraded the role of local govern-
ment considerably in terms of traditional notions of local democracy’ (Cram and
Richardson, 1993, p. 18). Going further, in a not entirely mischievous interroga-
tive, Pierre and Peters (2000) provocatively enquired, ‘Does (local) government
still matter?’ Their question forces a re-examination of first principles, always advis-
able if genuinely committed to a fundamental process of reform. Assuming that it
does matter, Bovaird et al. (2002) pose alternative questions reflecting ‘new sets of
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expectations from citizens in their locality’ (p. 2). Hence: ‘When does local gov-
ernment still matter? What functions could local authorities share with other stake-
holders?’ (our emphasis). In recognising the changing reality of the governmental
landscape of the local state, Bovaird et al. nonetheless contend, if rather banally,
that local authorities ‘still have a very powerful problem-solving capacity with
regard to some issues in some contexts’ (p. 14). Consequently, across Europe, ‘new
networks are also developing vertically between levels of government. There seems
to be a desire both at central and sub-national levels to transform traditional hier-
archical relationships more into co-operative relationships, or even partnerships’
(p. 19). Traditional modes of decision-making and delivery have changed.
In proclaiming a new world of local governance, even the United Kingdom gov-
ernment has acknowledged local authorities’ pre-eminence. ‘Councils are ideally
placed to work with government, their communities and the wider range of public,
private and voluntary sector bodies who operate at local level and who need to
come together if these challenges are to be successfully addressed’ (DETR, 1998,
p. 79, cited in Stewart, 2003, p. 15). A renaissance of the political dimension of
local authorities is discernible. For example, Bovaird et al. (2002) noted a new
concern for old values such as equity, ethics, trust and transparency which go
beyond the ‘3Es’ of New Public Management (NPM) (economy, efficiency and
effectiveness). There are multiple stakeholders’ approaches to public services
(design, production and evaluation), to problems in the local community and to
the decision mechanisms by which strategies should be made. To solve or at least
better manage ‘wicked’ issues, coordinating instruments like strategic plans and
partnerships need to be utilised. Information and communication technologies,
such as virtual networks or e-governance, will grow in significance. Concurrently,
it is likely that the shift to governance will be joined:
... by efforts to reinforce those areas of local public administration which
have emerged in the ‘local governance era’ as particularly weak. These
include in many (but not all) European countries: the role of politicians
in community leadership; the role of political parties in civic man-
agement; the role of professionals in innovations around service co-
production; and, the role of managers in developing the capacity of 
alternative service providers in the community (p. 235).
Criteria for Reform
Despite the lack of consensus on their relative importance, it is possible to estab-
lish some basic principles so that those charged with making political judgments
might be reasonably informed in their deliberations and determinations. Accord-
ing to the European Charter of Local Self-Government, a prerequisite of local
democracy is a clear division of responsibilities between central and local author-
ities. It argues that the assigning of financial resources of their own to local author-
ities should be more commensurate with the tasks for which they are responsible.
Moreover, they should have greater freedom to decide how to use these resources.
Furthermore, it commits signatories to apply ‘basic rules guaranteeing the politi-
cal, administrative and financial independence of local authorities ... [embodying]
the conviction that the degree of self-government enjoyed by local authorities may
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be regarded as a touchstone of genuine democracy’ (Norton, 1994, p. 19). However,
a dichotomy exists between countries that consider their local authorities as service
delivery institutions and others that see municipalities as mainly political and rep-
resentative institutions. Thus, for the CDLR:
Democratic quality and efficiency are elements that should be confined
in the best possible manner (note 7). ... In striking that balance, there
are many ways in which democratic participation can be expressed, not
only in the electoral arena. Indeed, there are connections between 
participation and service delivery, for example, where user-groups of 
citizens are created to evaluate the type and quality of services delivered
(CDLR, 2001, para. 9).
Historical circumstances, local specificities and/or value judgements yield different
approaches to a common dilemma: What is the ‘ideal’ size for local authorities?
Ideologies, mentalities and interests inform the debate whose considerations
include efficiency, democracy, promotion of economic development and distribu-
tion, although, because these are inherently normative evaluations, securing agree-
ment on a conceptual framework still less a blueprint is elusive (paragraph 12).
Thus, whereas ‘the assignment of territory, competency and functions between
levels of government should not be a shibboleth to the past, nor to a particular
economic or political theory’, tensions exist between:
... activity spaces which form the basis of participation and technical and
bureaucratic criteria for optimal administrative design. In geographical
terms this relates to the question of how the administrative space is
bounded. The ideal is of an activity space which is precisely matched by
administrative boundaries; that is, ‘truly bounded’. In this case people’s
personal lives and contact patterns give a natural ‘sense of community’
which encourages in a direct way a high level of participation in admin-
istration: the two reinforce each other. However, under and over bound-
ing also occur (Bennett, 1989, pp. 33–5) (see Figure 1 which illustrates
the ‘bounding’ concept).
‘Bounding’ is an important means of approaching the territorial structure of admin-
istration, particularly the development of reform. For decades, securing ‘bounding’
has been associated with the objective of increasing size. And yet, as Senior’s (1969)
dissenting memorandum to the report of the Redcliffe-Maud Commission on
English local government argued: ‘no objective basis exists on which to attribute
any material significance to population size as a factor in any way influencing the
performance of local government [Vol. 2 p. 268]’. Indeed, while administrative
economies of scale to induce efficiency are theoretically possible, bureaucratic over-
load, distance from the consumer, the difficulties of participation and adaptation
of decisions to needs have led to a dominance of practical inefficiency through dis-
economies of scale with size and consequent alienation of the population served.
Contending that administrative systems are ‘naturally subject to obsolescence’,
Bennett observed the ‘new fashion is flexible decentralisation – smaller scale and
the importance of individuals over collectives but also flexible aggregation, that is,
a means of linking small units and their competencies and financial resources to
gain economic/technical efficiency’ (p. 51). Examples would include the experi-
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ence within England’s metropolitan counties after 1986, or Scotland and Wales
after 1992. The parallels with the broader notion of the differentiated polity are
striking (see Wilson, 2005; Rhodes, 1997).
Local government’s primordial role, like any polity, reflects a sense of common
identity among its citizens which, at its most basic, may be defined as the con-
sciousness that they have more in common with each other than they have with
people living beyond their community boundary. Such consciousness is the sine
qua non of a democracy. In de Tocqueville’s aphorism: ‘man creates kingdoms 
and republics but townships seem to spring from the hand of God’ (de Tocqueville
(1962) cited in Sharpe, 1988, p. 91). In truth, however, the rationale for local gov-
ernment has always had both functional and non-functional origins. It depends
which role has the priority – that is, reflector of the subjective community or
provider of services. While reconciling ‘the two desiderata simply by pitching the
local government system at its smallest feasible scale’ is possible, the ‘functional
range is far too narrow for what most Western states regard as being appropriate
for local government. And, in any event, such self-contained communities no
longer exist, given the functional revolution and urbanization/sprawl’ (Sharpe,
1988, p. 91). With the political dimension of change, rational efficiency arguments
rarely explain local government structural modernisation anywhere, including the
United Kingdom (pp. 94–5).
Various national reports made ‘it fairly clear that, primarily, the size of a local
authority is a function of the services expected from it’ (Zehetner, quoted in
Norton, 1994, p. 38). However, reflecting Europe’s north–south dichotomy, charges
of functional obsolescence are less valid in those states based on the Napoleonic
model because the primacy of local government is its political cum representative
role, ‘... freed from the incubus of functionality, [they] can survive’. Also, the ‘art
of colonizing the centre – via national parties and the cumuls des mandates princi-
ple’ – was not acquired by northern Europe. Those elements at the centre may also
Figure 1: Forms of Bounding of Administrative Spaces
Under bounded Over bounded Truly bounded 
Notes: Administrative spaces (dotted lines); activity spaces (solid lines).
Source: Bennett (1989, p. 35).
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prefer the status quo of weak local government because their position is de facto
stronger (p. 97).
Small authorities were encouraged to form joint bodies to exercise func-
tions requiring large areas and resources, delegate functions upwards,
contract services out and adopt other means by which limitations of
smallness might be overcome. But the result could be that although com-
munal powers were maintained in principle, effective communal control
of key services was lost (p. 38).
Also, in joint compact or partnership arrangements, there can be problems of
coherence or ‘joined-up-ness’. By contrast, however, in the non-Napoleonic group,
including the United Kingdom as ‘the extreme case’ (p. 38), growing public pres-
sure for fairness, minimum standards and equality for all in the provision of public
services may dilute local government’s role as a representative body (Sharpe, 1988,
p. 100). In many ways, this is a testament to the fact that local authorities through-
out the British Isles have always been more ‘administrative’ than ‘governmental’
given their lack of general competence (notwithstanding the recent introduction
of ‘well-being’ powers). This reflects the longstanding debate within the United
Kingdom over the intrinsic value of local forms of governance which became crys-
tallised around essentially two poles. Utilitarian reformers like Jeremy Bentham
maintained that ‘local government units should be organized so as to efficiently
undertake administrative functions according to the rules determined by a popu-
larly elected national parliament’ (Chandler, 1991, p. 29). Within this tradition of
liberal centralism, the administrator Edwin Chadwick envisaged a system of local
government as an ‘agent’ for the centre (known as ‘the principal’) charged with
providing minimum national standards. Chadwick was deeply hostile to what he
identified as entrenched power for a minority and spoke of the ‘fallacy that local
government is self-government’ (cited in MacKenzie, 1961, p. 8). If somewhat
strange an outlook for a liberal ostensibly committed to a diffusion of political
power within the polity, the widespread albeit rather trivial examples of corrup-
tion prevalent at the time nourished such views. In contrast, others such as Joshua
Toulmin Smith, with localist ideas of organic evolution, advanced the notion of
partnership between the centre and localities believing local self-government to be
the ‘rock of our safety as a free state’. Nonetheless, while Toulmin Smith et al. ‘pro-
bably prevented the wholesale destruction of parish government’, the liberal
onslaught eventually triumphed and local government underwent substantial
reform and consolidation in terms of its structural configuration and functional
responsibilities (Chandler, 1991, p. 30). Thereafter, the triumph of liberal central-
ism ‘justified generations of British administrators in continuing reorganizations
which had little regard to the principles of local social responsibility. It also cut
Britain off from the constitutionalism of the continent’ (Norton, 1994, p. 26). More
recently, Pratchett (2004) considered the debate in terms of the ‘new localism’ as
a policy approach in the United Kingdom. Replete with references to ‘earned
autonomy’ and ‘constrained discretion’, ‘new localism’ resonates closely with 
Benthamite utilitarianism. Whatever additional powers were accorded to local
authorities, ‘new localism’ has done ‘little to shift power relations in favour of local-
ities’ (p. 371). At best, Labour’s ‘ “new localism” may have managed to clarify some
of the complexities that bedevil central-local relations [but] its capacity to resolve
the dilemma seems limited’ (p. 373).
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In another departure from European practice, British ‘exceptionalism’ witnessed
growing use of ‘special purpose’ authorities that burgeoned under Conservative
governments after 1979. The arrangements post-abolition of the Greater London
Council and Metropolitan County Councils, as well as the Area Boards in 
Northern Ireland, typify such bodies. The resultant ‘criss-crossing boundaries of
service authorities’ was described as ‘organised chaos’ by Owens and Norregaard
(1991, pp. 8–9). A rationale for such a configuration is offered from economic
theory on optimum size that predicts a model in which the local level is charac-
terised by a multitude of partly overlapping (in a spatial sense) public or semi-
public units, each providing specific services (pp. 8–9). However, there are limits
to the proliferation of separate authorities. The resultant misconceptions distort
considerations of structural reform of British local government. In the 1990s,
whether by ministerial fiat in Scotland and Wales, or through England’s tortuous
‘independent’ Local Government Commission, reorganisation was hampered by an
unseemly mix of political expediency, dubious provenance and procedural muddle.
The result, Stewart (2003) argued, was that ‘while one expects that form should
follow functions, in the reorganization process, form preceded functions and struc-
ture came before purpose. ... The phrase “unitary authority” is misleading. All it
means is that there is a single tier of local government, not that unitary authori-
ties bring together all the powers of government exercised at local level or even
those exercised through local organizations’ (p. 184). The outcome is that lower-
tiered and unitary authorities in the United Kingdom are some ‘ten times larger in
population than their equivalents in Europe’ (p. 43), reflecting the assumptions of
size-ism prevalent within British public administration. Local authorities are
viewed as agencies for the provision of service despite there being no clear link
between size and efficiency/effectiveness. As Stewart lamented, a ‘moment’s con-
sideration of European local government might have caused reflection. ... Both the
sense of community and the requirements of services are multi-leveled and do not
fit a single tier’ (p. 184).
A final but critical consideration is finance. Owens and Norregaard (1991) identify
two principal types of authority – comprehensive and constrained. Comprehensive
authorities have powers over both spending and revenue. Constrained authorities
can determine the allocation of spending but not the overall level of budget or tax
revenues (pp. 62–3). More than ever before, British local authorities (outside
Northern Ireland and, before nationalisation of business rating in 1993, a handful
of mainland authorities which possessed high non-domestic rate bases) exemplify
constrained authority; their overwhelming dependency on central government
grant leaves them hostage to the capricious ‘gearing effect’. Transparency is a 
necessary condition of accountability, with the balance of funding making ‘an 
enormous difference’ (House of Commons Select Committee (HC, 1998), cited in
Stewart, 2003, p. 228). The argument is not so much about local autonomy as it
is about local accountability. Drastic change in the balance of funding warrants new
sources of local taxation (p. 228).
Lessons for Undertaking Reform
The foregoing review is the necessary precursor to examining ‘real world’ situa-
tions. Theoretical abstractions notwithstanding, a distillation of the literature yields
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several key lessons that bear on any review exercise. Above all, the prime lesson,
as the CDLR (2001) stressed, is that any decisions on reform rest ultimately on sub-
jective, political judgments. Basically, it is inconceivable that political factors would
not colour (even subliminally) outcomes. Even in a ‘normal’ context, the calculus
of crude party political advantage compromises dispassionate technocratic solu-
tions; in divided societies or where the state’s very legitimacy may be contested,
such considerations assume immeasurably heightened significance. For example,
the effects of investing new functions with elected local councils are potentially
contentious. Similarly, reconfiguring boundaries entails immediate implications for
the party political complexion of new local authorities.
Beyond weighing political impacts, however, several second order factors – in
effect, the ‘comprehensive vision’ to which the CDLR referred – merit considera-
tion, despite the susceptibility to political machinations. Some concessions should
be made to ensure objective criteria exist before embarking on change. First,
intending reformers must recognise a new post-Fordist reality. Government
through most-purpose local authorities has been transformed into a variegated
pattern of governance that figures not only traditional local authority units but also
an array of other public, private and community/voluntary organisations. In par-
ticular, the emergence of partnership arrangements as a means of raising popular
engagement with the policy process has been striking in recent years, and is firmly
established within the received wisdom of what constitutes good government.
Second, reflecting on Bennett’s (1989) notion of ‘bounding’, there is a need to
ensure that any revised administrative boundaries relate to activity spaces. Third,
also related to bounding, is size. Despite lip-service paid to local government’s role
in ensuring a sense of community identity which usually favours smaller units,
these appear subordinate to the requirement of optimising functional capacity,
which favours larger units. Thus, in reconciling the two, the balance lies towards
the large end of the size spectrum, particularly in the case of local authorities with
a wider range of functions. European evidence suggests, however, that seeking a
one-size-fits-all solution does not work and that reconciling sense of community
and functional efficiency demands multiple tiers. Fourth, while economic theory
suggests a fragmented model of ‘organised chaos’ in terms of the configuration of
local units, practicalities demand substantial consolidation. Finally, in intergovern-
mental relationships, there is the perennially vexed issue of finance. Simply, trans-
parency demands realism in resource allocation, aligning functional responsibilities
with financial capacity.
What has become clear in the reform process is that local community politics matter
in Northern Ireland in the prolonged absence (or sporadic functioning) of a regional
tier. The strength of local identity, evident within emasculated councils, defies
imposition of a one-size-fits-all solution favoured by Westminster and Whitehall
through direct rule ministers. These push and pull tensions are being played out
in a number of ways as the reform of public administration progresses. There has
been a political backlash against attempts to direct councils towards accepting a
seven-council structure as an ‘optimal solution for service delivery’ ( Office of the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister [OFMDFM], 2005, p. 40). Local politicians
are deeply suspicious of proposals, which now favour the retention of a plethora
of non-departmental public bodies, albeit with improved accountability. Equally,
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the reformers have suggested that executive agencies should remain untouched – 
decisions on their future are to be left for a returning devolved assembly. All of
these smack of regulatory capture by a reform team comprising civil servants per-
ceived to be ‘looking after their own’, overseen by direct rule ministers who hold
an over-simplified view of administrative reform based on rational ‘solutions’. It is
to the detail of the reform process that we now turn.
Public Administration in Northern Ireland 
and Its Reform
To appreciate the nature of any reform exercise in Northern Ireland, it is prudent
to consider the overarching political cum constitutional circumstances within
which the present arrangements have been forged. Therefore, in this section, the
nature of the current system is outlined before, in turn, proceeding to establish the
nature of the reform process, to illustrate the challenges confronting those tasked
with advancing the reform agenda, and to set out the alternative models for reform
that have emerged.
The Status Quo
Several factors ensure that the system of public administration in Northern 
Ireland differs in crucial respects from that within the rest of the United Kingdom.
On a practical level, population (circa 1.7m inhabitants) coupled with its geo-
graphic extent ensures an idiosyncratic governmental configuration and associated
delineation of functions. Politically, however, a contested constitutional status
demands that solutions reflect both the history and distinctiveness of the province’s
status within the union and the relationship with its southern neighbour, as 
well as seeking to reconcile a bitterly divided community. Since 1972, Direct Rule,
though a short-term palliative pending a more durable agreed settlement, became
a long-term political fix aimed at containment. The ‘permanent impermanence’
(Knox, 1996) it entailed ushered in a system of political administration whose 
baffling intricacies inspired little public confidence and still less comprehension.
Progressively, both the Senior Civil Service and the unelected ministerially
appointed quangos acquired an enhanced role and disproportionate influence over
the formulation, development and implementation of public policy in Northern
Ireland, creating a tighter and more intimate policy network than in Scotland or
Wales, and in which administrative imperatives and interests predominated. The
resultant ‘technocracising of politics’ (Ditch and Morrissey, 1979, p. 111) reflects
the effective absence of pluralist liberal democracy as commonly understood.
While the Troubles were the catalyst for macropolitical change in Northern Ireland,
dissatisfaction with the existing sub-regional arrangements had been mounting
since the Second World War. The inability of the local government system to
provide services efficiently precipitated the growth of ad hoc statutory bodies and
the removal and centralisation of council functions (Knox, 2003, p. 461). Eventu-
ally, pressure built to overhaul a Victorian creation comprising too many small
councils, inadequately resourced through a limited rate base and overly dependent
on central grant for their income (Hayes, 1967). Although the Stormont Govern-
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ment responded with a series of consultations (NIG, 1966; 1969), the subsequent
criticisms of local government outlined in the Cameron Report (Cameron, 1969)
prompted the appointment in 1969 of an independent review body on local gov-
ernment, chaired by Sir Patrick Macrory.
The problem facing the Review Body was to construct a local govern-
ment system appropriate to a situation in which Stormont – at that time
the Northern Ireland equivalent of central government – had been or
would be allocated all those major services which, in other parts of
Britain, are regarded as wholly or partly the responsibility of local author-
ities (Alexander, 1982, p. 50).
In what amounted to a quantum leap in residualisation that characterised North-
ern Ireland’s local government, Macrory envisaged a two-tier structure: a lower
tier of district councils, with Stormont serving as the de facto top tier of local gov-
ernment, coterminous with the province, and responsible for regional services
accompanied by an array of area boards. However, the imposition of Direct Rule
superseded the reform, creating what was dubbed as the ‘Macrory Gap’ – having
removed erstwhile local services, these were now subject to the decisions of British
rather than Northern Ireland ministers. Consequently, in what would become the
limiting case of extended central control, trends which had seen a further upward
shift of functional competence from lower to upper tiers of local government in
Great Britain (to the counties in England and Wales and regions in Scotland) were
reflected in Northern Ireland. That is, the formal system of local government would
comprise 26 district councils albeit ‘best thought of as the lower tier in a system
that simply lacks a democratically elected higher level of local government’
(Hampton, 1991, p. 54). While the map of district boundaries themselves largely
satisfied Bennett’s concept of ‘bounding’, the addition of several layers of other
bodies – area boards, regional bodies (and their sub-divisions) and parliamentary
constituency boundaries – vitiated any overall sense of being fully bounded (see
Figure 2, below).
Quangos became the mainstay of Northern Ireland’s governance, providing most
public services and accounting for two-thirds of the devolved budget. While they
accentuated the democratic deficit, quangos proved valuable – amidst the quag-
mire of sectarianism – for administering and delivering public service largely free
from controversy. However, questions of legitimacy and accountability are accom-
panied by concern over efficiency given the plethora of bodies. Simply, Northern
Ireland is over-governed – or, to be precise, over-administered. De Lammanais’s
(1848) adage: ‘apoplexy at the centre and anaemia at the periphery’, encapsulates
the state of public administration within Northern Ireland after 1973.
The Reform Process
Beyond contributing to peace, devolution also offered the prospect of dramatically
rebalancing the political–administrative nexus (democratising the quangos/rein-
vigorating local councils). Indeed, this secondary dimension has assumed increas-
ing prominence, given the continuing uncertainty over the fate of devolution.
However, Northern Ireland’s political masters were confronted with an immediate
problem: Should they assume that devolution will be restored or should any pro-
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Figure 2: Northern Ireland’s 26 District Councils after 1973
posals for reform be adaptable to an extended period of Direct Rule? Indeed, should
two alternative systems be planned? In the event, it fell to the devolved executive
to commence the process of brokering change.
Thus, the RPA was launched on the 24th of June, 2002. The origins of the RPA
were in the Programme for Government in which the executive pledged from the
outset to ‘lead the most effective and accountable form of government in North-
ern Ireland’ (NIG, 2001). David Trimble MLA, the then First Minister, argued:
The RPA is one of the major tasks facing the Executive and will be central
to the way in which we deliver, structure and organize our public ser-
vices in the future. This is the opportunity of a generation to put in place
a modern, accountable, effective system of public administration that can
deliver a high quality set of public services to our citizens. It is an oppor-
tunity we must take (Hansard, 2002 [February 25]).
Northern Ireland has moved from a position of ‘democratic deficit’ to surfeit mode
with 18 MPs, 108 MLAs, 582 local councilors and 3 MEPs. Aside from considera-
tions of political representation, rationalising the bureaucracy surrounding public
service provision was central, as the assembly struggled (devoid of tax-varying
powers except the regional rate) to meet rising public expectations within a finite
budget. The assembly inherited a system of over 150 non-departmental public
Source: M. Connolly (1991) Politics and Policy Making in Northern Ireland, Hemel Hempstead: Philip Allan, p. 74.
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bodies (NDPBs) (with in excess of 2000 appointees). Just one example illustrates
the problem. In education, as well as the Stormont Department of Education, there
are five Education and Library Area Boards, the Governing Bodies’ Association,
the Irish Medium Schools’ Body, the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Edu-
cation, the Regional Training Unit, the Council for Catholic Maintained Schools,
and the Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment. In England,
one Local Education Authority (LEA) per area would normally suffice. As one trade
unionist in the education sector remarked: ‘There is chronic over administration
of schools in NI [Northern Ireland]. A radical overhaul is required and this rebal-
ance is long overdue’ (Frank Bunting, Northern Ireland Secretary, Irish National
Teachers’ Organisation, cited in Belfast Telegraph, ‘Overhaul needed “to get funds to
schools” ’, 2004 [May 6], p. 7). To satisfy the requirements of a power-sharing exec-
utive, a cumbersome system of 11 government departments (to replace six) was
also introduced.
The first and deputy first ministers suggested that among the most important 
issues which should be addressed by the review are structure, accountability and
responsibilities of local government, NDPBs and government agencies. Ministers
agreed that the RPA is likely to have implications on the functions exercised by
the executive even if the institutions established by the Agreement and the divi-
sion of functions were not to be considered. In general, politicians welcomed the
RPA, not least because there is a residual anti-quango feeling overhanging from
Direct Rule. A majority of MLAs are also local councillors and experienced at first
hand relative powerlessness as elected representatives working on behalf of their
constituents. The scope of the RPA has, however, proved controversial. Some politi-
cians questioned the effectiveness of an exercise which excludes the Stormont
departments, a theme articulated by trenchant critic of the Agreement, Robert
McCartney MLA.
Everyone accepts that quangos, or many of them, must go and they
should have gone long ago. They represented the veneer or cosmetic
surface that several British Governments used to give a semblance of
democratic accountability to Direct Rule. ... Everyone agrees that there
must be a great pruning back. However, that disguises the fact that super-
imposed on top of a layer of undemocratic agencies was a layer that, in
some respects, was little better – devolved government (Hansard, 2002
[June 24]).
These calls were rejected as seeking to ‘renegotiate the Agreement by the back
door’ and a distraction from the main emphasis of the RPA. Other reactions centred
on how the RPA should be undertaken. Calls for a ‘Macrory II’, that is, an inde-
pendent enquiry, were rejected. Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, when governments
preferred (Royal) Commissions, the executive eschewed an independent enquiry.
Instead, the RPA is led by a multi-disciplinary team of officials in the Office of the
First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), working with the advice of
a team of independent experts (Tom Frawley, the Northern Ireland Ombudsman,
is in charge of the consultation process), and reporting to an executive sub-com-
mittee. Concerns were expressed that a review led by officials from the OFMDFM
amounted to regulatory capture by civil servants and the executive, with inde-
pendent experts offering only a façade of objectivity. Seamus Close MLA argued:
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When politicians are seen to be examining themselves, and when they
consult, the answer that comes back is invariably the answer that the
politicians want to end up with, not the answer that the people demand.
If we allow the OFMDFM or the Committee of the Centre to conduct
this review, we will not get the result that the people who sent you here
demand and deserve (Hansard, 2004 [February 25])
Moreover, the in-house management of the review prompted criticism that both
pro-Agreement executive parties and civil servants are keen to protect the config-
uration of both devolved political institutions and central government departments,
regardless of administrative logic.
Challenges for the RPA
Several major challenges confronted the RPA. Securing an appropriate level of
political accountability demands hard choices about the future role of local gov-
ernment and NDPBs. There is a need to release and reassign resources within the
restrictive Westminster-controlled Northern Ireland Block of public expenditure
towards local, needs-assessed, public service priorities. Simultaneously, however,
the RPA must also adhere to the principles of equality and human rights that form
the heart of the Agreement. It must continue to adopt what is best in the mod-
ernising agenda of New Public Management such as ‘best value’, responsiveness to
customers, market awareness, being more entrepreneurial, structural de-layering
and downsizing and promoting a shift from appointed to elected bodies. Among
crucial questions figure: (1) What should be the optimal distribution of functions
between the various tiers of government – regional, sub-regional and local? (2) If
the view is that under devolution a number of the executive NDPBs need to be
integrated into the mainstream departments or councils, how best should this be
done? (3) Given the size of Northern Ireland, could services be rationalised at two
levels – Stormont and local government? (4) If so, how should those services be
allocated and how many local authorities would be needed to deliver any proposed
functions?
Despite the suspension of the Northern Ireland executive and assembly (now for
the fourth time), Direct Rule ministers have permitted – indeed, facilitated and
encouraged – the RPA to continue in the hope, if not the expectation, that once
devolution is restored, the momentum of reform can be maintained. Regardless 
of its outcome, the RPA has trail blazed in its innovative efforts to achieve a 
thoroughgoing analysis of the wider public sector, including commissioning a series
of specialist briefing papers, extensive consultations, omnibus surveys, as well as
promoting widespread dissemination via the Internet (for full details, see RPA
Website, 1980).
A major challenge has concerned the scope of the review. Many politicians and
senior civil servants regard the departmental structures established under the
Agreement as sacrosanct while Stormont politicians, starved of executive author-
ity under Direct Rule, eschew any notion of local subsidiarity. The attitude of Stor-
mont may exemplify bureau-shaping behaviour by civil servants and politicians,
whereby they use changes to organisational structures to enhance their own
welfare. Consequently, buoyed by protection conferred by the in-built exclusion
of government departments, some civil servants have been promoting the exercise
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as a ‘review of local government’ and ‘culling councils’ from 26 to 8, 6 or even 5.
Ironically, local government’s centrality in the RPA belies its small budget (5
percent of the devolved block), limited scope for additional value for money (VFM)
savings, and self-evident democratic credentials. In truth, as former deputy first
minister, Seamus Mallon MLA, remarked: ‘It is clear from the expenditure that
local government is a crucial part of this. However it is only a part. The general
administration is crucially important’ (NIA Oral questions, 2000 [December 11]).
Stormont, quangos and other public bodies have underscored the sense that ‘a
review of local government’ is afoot, given their remarkably low-key reaction con-
sidering their own vulnerability to the RPA’s deliberations. Partly, lacking an organ-
ising umbrella body, the case against such quangos often goes by default. Moreover,
by contrast, local government has readily acquiesced in the ‘review of local gov-
ernment’ thesis. Galvanised through a newly created Northern Ireland Local Gov-
ernment Association, the widespread feeling has been that ‘our time has come’.
Councils crave the opportunity to exert more influence over other public sector
providers in their areas – a focus of accountability without necessarily having to
take on the role of service deliverer although this thinking is often constrained by
an inability to think outside the existing parameters of the present structures. It
presupposes that the RPA, like the devolution which precipitated it, automatically
entails a revised and expanded role for councils when, as Scottish, Welsh and
(potentially English) experiences illustrate, devolution frequently entails local gov-
ernment losing powers up to the devolved regional/national tier.
A further related challenge concerns the future of the Northern Ireland Civil
Service’s 25 Next Steps Agencies. Unlike their parent departments, agencies are
included in the RPA, underscoring the point that this is a wider review of public
administration, not simply local government. Accounting for around 80 percent of
civil servants, agencies spend large sums of public money, being integral to the
functioning of government, and providing several erstwhile local government ser-
vices (such as water, roads, planning and rates collection) (Carmichael, 2002).
Therefore, a proper evaluation of their role and future is unavoidable if the RPA’s
recommendations are to carry conviction. However, as yet, agencies have been
quietly sidestepped, a process to which agencies have been willing accomplices.
Already, one agency (Training and Employment) has been reabsorbed into its
parent department (Employment and Learning), following devolution on the
grounds of the latter’s otherwise ‘non-viable’ situation. It seems likely that any rec-
ommendations for particular agencies may well entail similar implications for their
respective departments; this is another example of how, whether intentional or
not, the RPA’s recommendations will have spillover effects for the 11 central
departments.
Models for Reform
In October 2003, the RPA team launched a public consultation document that 
set out five possible models for consideration in rethinking the structural archi-
tecture of public services. In keeping with the innovative theme of the RPA process,
the consultation document is user-friendly. Echoing the ‘comprehensive vision’
commended by the CDLR and academic literature, it sets out the principles of 
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characteristics that any proposed new system of public administration must satisfy,
reflects on ways in which we can deliver and improve public services (in parti-
cular, through enhanced mechanisms for accountability and participation) and 
offers five ‘high-level’ models for consideration on the future roles of central gov-
ernment, public bodies and local government. The five models are summarised
thus:
(1) Status quo: no change in the overall structure of public administration.
(2) Centralised: all major services delivered directly by government departments.
(3) Regional and sub-regional public bodies: a range of public bodies, operating
either regionally or sub-regionally, would deliver public services.
(4) Reformed status quo with enhanced local government: while keeping the
main features of the current system, democratically elected local authorities
would be vested with new responsibilities.
(5) Strong local government: major public services would be the responsibility of
a smaller number of new local councils.
Interestingly, despite its remit, the RPA adroitly intimates that it is likely to have
implications for the functions exercised by the executive.
Some 170 responses were made to the consultation document. No consensus
emerged on what functions might be returned to the councils but most of the main
political parties endorsed models 4 and 5, with some wishing elements of model 3
to be included. In addition, an insistence on appropriate safeguards (in terms of
minority protection and the like) has been made, especially by nationalists, but also
by unionists (who form a minority in most councils in the west of the province).
These calls reflect longstanding and deep-seated fears concerning the abuses of
powers (especially of employment and housing allocations) that discredited the
pre-1973 system of local government and which, indeed, did so much to stoke the
embers of inter-communal tension that precipitated the Troubles. Reorganising
councils is not without difficulties, however. While reference to American or Euro-
pean practice suggests that the reallocation of major quango functions to local gov-
ernment is perfectly plausible, the pervasive size-ism (‘big is beautiful’) that has
informed successive local government reorganisations across the British Isles sug-
gests an end product comprising fewer but larger councils and fewer major
quangos, with their roles being effectively subsumed into the remit of enhanced
local authorities – or, of course, government departments or agencies – however
configured. Should reform proceed, the likelihood of bigger authorities emerging
is much higher if Direct Rule remains rather than devolution given the widely
shared local predilection for small units.
One key consideration with the proposals is the perceived threat posed by any sub-
stantially reinvigorated tier of local government to the devolved institutions.
Simply, there may not be room for two major actors on the combined local/regional
scene. The situation is redolent of how the former Belfast Corporation was often
perceived as an upstart to the old Stormont. The touchpaper for conflict could be
finance. Having been excluded from its initial remit, the RPA has so far said nothing
about financing an enlarged portfolio of local government functions. Currently,
devoid of transparency, financial considerations are rarely understood by voters
with the result that, while Northern Ireland ratepayers fare comparatively well
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compared with their counterparts in Great Britain, there is a widespread feeling of
being hard done by. A separate rating review exercise has proposed discarding the
present rating system and a switch to one based on capital values (akin to the
Council Tax in Great Britain) (DFPNI, 2004). However, with some 80 percent of
Northern Ireland’s district councils’ income coming from the district rate (the
remainder coming from the redistributed proceeds of the Northern Ireland regional
rate plus other central government grants), any major change in the functional
responsibilities of local authorities threatens to seriously destabilise the basis of the
high degree of (nominal) local financial accountability between citizen and council.
Precisely because of their minor (and inexpensive) functions, the potential for
financial accountability to local voters is much stronger than the altogether more
tenuous link that exists in Great Britain, where the gearing effect attenuates the
direct link (though, in practice, like all voting in Northern Ireland, local elections
invariably revert to type, that is, a tribal headcount). However, without investing
local authorities with a more robust source of locally derived revenue (such as local
income tax – precluded by Westminster), new councils may be far more depen-
dent on Stormont grant with all its attendant consequences.
Given the continuing impasse in the efforts to resuscitate the fledgling devolved
institutions, reviving local government may bypass the obstacles on the road to
maintaining and building a (relatively) peaceful Northern Ireland. For sure, local
councils have been actively engaged in the review process and a measure of their
influence can be gleaned from the options proposed by the RPA team in their 
consultation document. In some ways, after 30 years of constitutional experimen-
tation amid political turbulence, local government has remained a stoically demo-
cratic forum, albeit with tightly circumscribed powers. Its time may well have
come. That said, not for the first time has such a proposition arisen, appearing 
previously as ‘Model F’ in a government working paper (UK Government, 1979),
only to be returned to the sagging shelf of failed initiatives within the Northern
Ireland Office.
Nonetheless, respecting the time-honoured practice of rehashing old ideas, Minis-
ter Ian Pearson, in a rather pre-emptive press release (4 May 2004), announced
that ‘I see the final model including:
(1) A significant reduction in the numbers of public bodies, including health
service bodies;
(2) Local councils being reduced from 26 to single figures, but having more
powers, and boundaries that are fully aligned with other service providers in
their locality;
(3) Arrangements at a local level to ensure the maintenance of local identify and
community input to decision-making; and
(4) Robust governance arrangements to ensure transparent decision-making,
fairness and the protection of minority interests.’
Pearson added that the scale of the proposed reforms would inevitably require a
lengthy implementation phase. A final consultation report was published in Spring
2005 and made reference to a range of alternatives based on 7-, 11- and 15-council
models to replace the current 26-council structure. There was a clear predilection
for the replacement model to be based on seven councils. Based on a seven-council
model, each new unit would average some 250,000 habitants with a ceiling of
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300,000 (RPA Website, 1980). The likely political control would be: three nation-
alist and three unionist councils; Belfast would remain under no overall control.
In what is ‘essentially a two tier model’, the regional (that is upper) level would
be responsible for policy development, strategic planning, setting standards of
service delivery, monitoring that delivery, plus delivering regional services. ‘Most
service delivery, however, would be at sub-regional level. Services will be deliv-
ered by new large, stronger Councils’ working with ‘the local offices of regional
service providers’ (Pearson, 2004).
With no short-term prospects for the assembly’s revival, Direct Rule ministers may
be prepared to follow through on this important issue. However, the spectre of the
continued failure on the macropolitical front casts its long shadow. Coupled with
the call for the mechanics of internal power sharing (as provided for in the Agree-
ment) to be reconsidered, Peter Robinson, the Democratic Unionist Party’s deputy
leader and erstwhile minister in the previous executive, argued:
It is impossible to look at the Review of Public Administration outside
the content of what is happening at the regional level. ... Clearly, arrange-
ments which would be suitable in the absence of a devolved adminis-
tration would not be suitable in the event of there being a return to
devolution. ... There is a direct relationship between what arrangements
we have at Stormont and what can be done at local government level
(Robinson, 2003).
With the DUP now the driving force within Unionism, therefore, any serious 
movement on the RPA might seem inextricably linked with the wider constitu-
tional situation.
Evaluation
No system of public administration is immutable. Shifts in social, economic and
political circumstances demand periodic re-examination of existing sub-national
governance (function, form, finance) to test its robustness to meet with the chal-
lenges imposed on, and the expectations placed upon, it. In turn, there are con-
comitant effects upon the internal operation of individual state actors and the
conduct of intergovernmental relations. Moreover, with the shift from welfare to
regulatory state, there are consequences for the relations with the penumbra of
other public, private, community and voluntary organisations into which each
regional and local authority is networked. Cursory examination of international
practice demonstrates the absence of uniformly accepted and applied criteria in
devising and constructing structural configurations for government. Nonetheless,
from our ‘lessons for undertaking reform’, several tentative conclusions can be
drawn about how reform in Northern Ireland might be assessed.
Above all, if entirely predictable, politics is beginning to shape the reform agenda
(and reaction to it) in terms of the possible future configuration of new sub-
regional structures, their likely party political complexion and the relative com-
plexity of the emerging ‘super’ councils as they relate to Stormont. In the bitter
context of Northern Ireland’s polarised society, the imperative of raw political cal-
culus is all the more acute. Nonetheless, other factors are discernible. Befitting the
recent focus on structures of governance, there is a heavy emphasis on partnership
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both at council level with other providers (such as public, private, voluntary and
community) as well as between the tiers of government – regional and sub-
regional/local. This emphasis builds on the already extensive use of partnership
arrangements in local government with respect to disbursing European Union
monies such as PEACE I and II. The ‘bounding’ concept is evident from the work
reported by the RPA team (RPA Website, 1980) with a particular stress placed on
travel to work patterns in the derivation of tentative 6- and 7-council models. These
models are borne of a gathering momentum for larger units of local government
that reflects the pervasive size-ism familiar in Great Britain and, while contrary to
expressions of local preference, epitomises Direct Rule thinking. Contrary to
‘organised chaos’ of some economic theory, the fragmentation and overlap in many
ways so characteristic of the present arrangements are eschewed in favour of con-
solidation through coterminosity in the emerging proposals. Financing the pro-
posals will also be a vexed issue not least because of the problems which have
arisen in introducing water charges – local people (including a cross-party con-
sensus of politicians) want to know why they have ‘to pay twice for water’ arguing
that the regional rate includes a charge for water services. Such public hostility and
pledges of resistance including a non-payment campaign do not bode well for a
complete review of the financing of local government as the public may well con-
clude that it has been conned – hardly the desired end product of any review.
Inevitably, of course, ‘no government starts with a tabula rasa – there are histori-
cal factors and the inertia of the status quo to be taken into account’ (Kingdom,
1991, pp. 37–8). Nowhere is the legacy of past events more telling than in 
Northern Ireland. Despite insidious and ongoing paramilitary violence, devolved
government (should it be restored) and reformed local governance arrangements
build in a degree of electoral accountability that reaffirms the wider popular desire
for long-term stability and peaceful co-existence, albeit with different long-term
political aspirations. Thus, while the fate of the Agreement itself remains uncer-
tain and its implementation incomplete, a 30-year moratorium on long overdue
administrative reform has at least been lifted. In breaking the impasse, the subse-
quent launch of the RPA – and the determination to continue and conclude it
before then implementing its recommendations – offers the prospect of partial
improvement in the provision of public services, local public accountability and
value for money. Ian Pearson, the minister currently responsible, claimed the
‘Review of Public Administration is the most far-reaching examination of how
public services should be delivered to citizens that I am aware of anywhere – apart,
possibly, from Iraq’ (N10 Press Release, 2004 [March 4]). Whether the RPA merits
the minister’s lofty claims or not can be debated. In many ways, its parameters
have already constrained its outcomes. The failure to include a formal considera-
tion of the central departments, or the thorny issue of finance, detracts from the
RPA, though the implications for both cannot be sidestepped and, informally, are
recognised as such. Certainly, the RPA has been comprehensive, the canvassing of
public opinion exhaustive and the output from the extensive engagement of inde-
pendent research voluminous (see RPA Website). Deficiencies notwithstanding,
there is every prospect that a major overhaul and improvement of the system of
sub-regional governance in Northern Ireland will help to compensate for inertia at
the macro level. If, as a result, the local protagonists can work together coopera-
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tively where hitherto they have proved incapable of so doing, there may yet be
hope for political progress on the broader future of Northern Ireland.
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